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1. Introduction 
The cumulative effect of empirical research over time is 
often to modify or to qualify the conventional wisdom 
on a given topic. This has arguably been the case with 
research on elections and democratic accountability. 
Tremendous rhetorical and ideological leverage has 
been gained for generations, and for centuries in some 
parts of the globe (Maloy, 2008), through the notion 
that periodic competitive elections allow ordinary peo-
ple to sanction or otherwise to control policy-making 
elites. But the “third wave” of democratization in the 
1990’s triggered intensified scrutiny of this proposition, 
both theoretically and empirically (see Przeworski, 
Stokes, & Manin, 1999), and the resulting scholarly in-
quest has led to significant (though not absolute) levels 
of what might be termed “electoral skepticism”. As a 
result, the relation between competitive elections and 
democratic accountability is now widely understood to 
be problematic and delicate rather than natural and 
robust (see Anderson, 2007; Maloy, 2014). 
Three types of normative and programmatic re-
sponse to electoral skepticism present interesting op-
tions for the future of democratic institutions. One is to 
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continue to defend periodic competitive elections in 
more or less the forms they take in the wealthier and 
older democracies, but to do so on modified grounds. 
There are other political values besides popular power, 
after all, and “minimalist” theories of democracy (e.g. 
Przeworski, 1999) have plausibly identified several 
candidates, notably civil peace, as resulting from a 
modicum of electoral competition among political 
elites. Empirical studies of “losers’ consent” (see An-
derson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005) can 
be understood as contributing to this normative pro-
ject of justifying electoral democracy in chastened 
terms. A second kind of response to electoral skepti-
cism is to pursue democratic accountability through 
non-electoral devices such as random selection, ap-
plied to new kinds of legislative process (e.g. Callen-
bach & Phillips, 2008; Leib, 2004; McCormick, 2011; 
Sutherland, 2008; Zakaras, 2010). A third response is to 
pursue further investigation of the precise conditions 
under which democratic accountability could plausibly 
result from periodic elections. Since the most direct 
route to the possibility of deliberate change lies in for-
mal rules and procedures, deepening our knowledge of 
specifically institutional factors of electoral accounta-
bility might support practical reform proposals for in-
stitutional design. 
This article is an attempt to assay the last of these 
options by systematically charting, in conceptual terms, 
the intermediate institutional conditions of electoral 
accountability. There is a well established literature in 
political science on the effects of institutional variation 
on electoral outcomes which could inform such an ef-
fort, but these studies tend to focus on the grand, sys-
temic level of constitutional structures or electoral sys-
tems (e.g. Carey, 2009; Hellwig & Samuels, 2008; 
Powell, 2000)—where only major political upheaval 
could lead to change. What is still needed, if we are to 
make a fair assessment of the institutional possibilities 
of electoral accountability, is a theoretic framework for 
intermediate conditions, in the middle range of institu-
tionalization where the design and interpretation of 
empirical studies could interface in a constructive and 
coherent fashion with normative and programmatic 
proposals. My purpose, then, is to lay a conceptual 
foundation for future studies of and efforts toward 
electoral redesign. Instead of testing empirical hypoth-
eses, I am attempting to survey the field of theoretic 
possibilities and to provide a road-map for designing 
empirical studies to explore those possibilities further. 
The analysis below identifies the general value of 
popular power as the normative stakes in investigating 
the strength or weakness of electoral accountability (in 
Section 2) and then offers an exercise in empirically in-
formed political theory to identify potential institution-
al responses. I reinterpret previous theoretic work in 
principal-agent theory (in Section 3), emphasizing the 
skeptical drift of that tradition, and derive from it four 
“crucial conditions” of electoral accountability (in Sec-
tion 4). I then engage empirical work on elections to 
identify, within these four general categories, ten spe-
cific “spoiler conditions” that militate against account-
ability and provide ammunition for electoral skepticism 
(in Section 5). At the same time, however, this “top 
ten” list supplies a basis for developing intermediate 
institutional conditions that could counter the spoiler 
conditions and thereby promote greater accountability 
through elections. 
2. Conceptual Contours of Electoral Accountability 
Empirical scholars of elections have long recognized 
that their factual findings are implicated in core con-
cepts and propositions of democratic theory. Perhaps 
the most basic principle involved is popular power: pe-
riodic competitive elections have often been valued for 
their presumed ability to enable ordinary citizens to 
exercise control over their lives, or at least over the 
public policies that shape, structure, or otherwise af-
fect their lives. Yet “power” is a general term that can 
encompass a wide variety of forms and degrees, as illus-
trated by the crucial dichotomy of “control” and “influ-
ence” (Key, 1966). Whether and when citizens can exer-
cise directed, purposeful control over public policy, as 
opposed to effective yet diffuse influence, is therefore a 
key question for analytic and normative theory alike. 
Because conventional assumptions about electoral 
accountability hold that elections enable voters to 
sanction governments, it is important to recognize that 
the power of sanction might in theory lead to control, 
or to influence, or to something in between. My analy-
sis does not take a position on this spectrum, either 
analytically (is it possible for elections to effect one or 
the other type of popular power?) or normatively 
(would it be good if elections could effect one or the 
other type of popular power?), but is addressing the 
debate in a fundamental way nonetheless. I am trying 
to show that this debate is still relevant and consequen-
tial, rather than purely academic—against the notion 
that the value of popular power via elections should be 
discarded as practically futile, in favor of other values. 
What I offer below, then, is not a normative analysis of 
which values elections ought and ought not to serve, but 
rather a conceptual analysis of what sorts of institutional 
conditions can and cannot serve the general principle of 
popular power. As I proceed, I will use “power” loosely, 
sometimes as control and other times as influence: the 
intermediate-conditions framework contributed by this 
article can provide an essential bridge between theory 
and empirics for projects of institutional design which 
are geared toward either type of power. 
Since elections (unlike initiatives and referenda) of-
fer candidates and parties rather than policies as the 
objects of citizens’ choice, popular power over policy is 
mediated by the electoral sanction wielded by voters 
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over those candidates and parties. For this reason, 
principal-agent theory provides a useful analytic start-
ing-point for studying elections as vehicles of institu-
tionalized popular power. 
Two issues must be distinguished when thinking of 
elections as mediating the relationship between voters 
as principals and politicians as agents. (The conceptual 
framework set up in this paragraph, and employed 
throughout, is abbreviated and adapted from Maloy, 
2014, pp. 14-15.) First and foremost is the question of 
how far the agents implement the principals’ will or 
serve their interest. (The distinction between will and 
interest is important, analytically and normatively, but 
does not affect the basic conceptual framework.) This 
is the question of responsiveness, strictly speaking. But 
a second, distinct question is also important: what 
mechanisms are supposed to enforce responsiveness? 
This is the question of accountability, strictly speaking, 
since elections are supposed to give voters an effective 
sanction that will bear some causal value toward re-
sponsiveness by deterring politicians from being un-
faithful. Responsiveness and accountability are there-
fore best considered as two aspects of the broader 
phenomenon of democratic representation, and in 
principle they may vary independently of one another, 
depending on circumstances (i.e. responsive govern-
ment may vary for reasons unrelated to electoral sanc-
tions, and vice versa). This distinction is also important 
because a plausible line of thought holds that the 
weight of democratic value really lies mostly with re-
sponsiveness, relegating accountability to a contingent 
means to that end, so that skepticism about accounta-
bility (though justified in itself) should not trouble us 
much but should merely refocus our attention on re-
sponsiveness (Anderson, 2007, pp. 289-290). In short, I 
am attempting to pre-empt this line of thought by re-
examining the capacity of electoral institutions to de-
liver effective sanctions into the hands of voters. 
When we think about the significance of institu-
tional variation for conditions of electoral accountabil-
ity, previous empirical literatures provide some guid-
ance at the grand, systemic level of constitutional 
structures (i.e. presidential vs. parliamentary systems) 
and electoral formulae (i.e. proportional vs. majoritari-
an systems). These insights have practical application in 
relatively rare cases of major upheaval, when the most 
basic constitutional structures may be changed in de-
liberate fashion, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Tunisia, and 
Egypt in the past decade or so. Richer, more estab-
lished democracies may also have opportunities to 
change institutions at the systemic level, on occasion. 
But practical reform efforts are more likely at the mid-
dle range of institutional design, through majoritarian 
processes of ordinary legislation rather than super-
majoritarian processes of constitutional amendment—
or indeed extralegal processes, as in the four cases 
mentioned above. 
The search for intermediate conditions of account-
ability should begin with general analytic principles 
about which characteristics would be theoretically deci-
sive for elections’ capacity to endow voters with effec-
tive sanctioning powers. Principal-agent theory, albeit 
reinterpreted somewhat, provides useful prompts to-
ward this end (in Section 3), leading to four general 
types of accountability condition (in Section 4). Empirical 
research on elections can then be engaged to direct the 
analysis toward more specific conditions in the middle 
range of institutionalized accountability (in Section 5). 
3. Principal-Agent Models and Their Limitations 
Principal-agent theory has succeeded in isolating elec-
toral accountability as a problem for investigation in 
fairly precise terms and has inspired some empirical 
testing over the years. More to the point, for my pur-
poses, are the limitations that it has identified in elec-
tions’ capacity to serve as vehicles of popular power. 
Principal-agent theory’s efforts in specifying necessary 
conditions that must obtain in order for electoral ac-
countability to be analytically plausible are in fact com-
patible with a robust skepticism about electoral ac-
countability in the real world. 
Barro (1973) is often credited with having planted 
the seeds for the principal-agent approach to elections, 
and his legacy is best understood as including signifi-
cant limitations on the possibility of accountability. He 
kept his theoretic model simple by assuming the exist-
ence of three empirical conditions: (a) the presence of 
competitive elections (Barro, 1973, p. 19), (b) the ab-
sence of incumbents’ control over the electoral process 
itself (p. 26), and (c) the absence of political parties (p. 
41). These admittedly unrealistic conditions were nec-
essary for what Barro called “electoral control,” with 
the clear implication that such control would be atten-
uated in actual contexts where the necessary condi-
tions were not present. 
Ferejohn (1986) noticed two other implicit but cru-
cial assumptions of Barro’s analysis: (d) symmetric in-
formation and (e) unitary evaluative standards. Finding 
these conditions also to be unrealistic, he replaced 
them with asymmetric information as between voters 
and incumbents and diversity of normative criteria 
among voters themselves (Ferejohn, 1986, p. 10). Fere-
john’s conclusion was that modifying Barro’s fourth 
and fifth assumptions in this way would allow incum-
bents to exploit their superior information by masking 
their real failings and “to play off the voters against 
one another” in order to maximize chances of re-
election (see also Ferejohn, 1999, pp. 132-134). This 
analysis represented a significant gain in realism by in-
troducing political manipulation as a factor. The result, 
in Ferejohn’s words, “vastly reduc[ed] the level of elec-
toral control” even compared to Barro’s already mod-
est expectations—unless, that is, citizens could under-
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take “sociotropic” voting by abandoning their self-
regarding motives in favor of some unitary criterion of 
public welfare (Ferejohn, 1986, pp. 20-22). In effect, 
Ferejohn managed to make Barro’s assumption about 
informational symmetry to seem less problematic while 
still getting stuck at the assumption about unitary evalu-
ative standards. As the rational-choice model of elec-
toral accountability became more realistic in its assump-
tions, expected levels of popular power got weaker. 
More recent theoretic work on principal-agent 
models of electoral accountability has struggled to 
paint any brighter a picture, despite the occasional 
glimmer of light. On the one hand, some theorists sug-
gest that two new assumptions about the necessary 
conditions for electoral accountability can realistically 
be satisfied. To summarize, Barro’s five original as-
sumptions were symmetric information, unitary evalu-
ative standards, the absence of political parties, com-
petitive elections, and independent electoral structures 
(i.e. immune to manipulation by incumbents). Recent 
studies have modified the first, informational assump-
tion by focussing on the quality of voters’ information, 
rather than symmetry, and have made explicit a sixth 
assumption to the effect that politicians must feel in-
centivized to gain and retain office (see Ashworth, 
2012). Others have suggested that the problem of cor-
ruption or shirking by agents can be reasoned away 
within this sort of framework. To the extent that 
“agents have an interest in making themselves ac-
countable in order to get the principal to trust them 
with more resources,” politicians should be expected 
to institute self-imposed constraints like direct prima-
ries and campaign-finance regulations (Ferejohn, 1999, 
pp. 138-141, 148-150). Some of Barro’s assumptions 
about necessary conditions, it seems, could be satisfied 
or relaxed. 
On the other hand, the overall picture still seems 
cloudy, and a strong (though not total) form of skepti-
cism has been built on the basis of considerations gen-
erally familiar from the early rational-choice efforts. 
Above all is voters’ poor information, undoubtedly the 
leading theme of the most insightful studies (Besley, 
2006, pp. 37-43; Ferejohn, 1999, p. 132; Manin, Prze-
worski, & Stokes, 1999, pp. 41-42; Maravall, 1999, pp. 
159-161). A related problem is that complex policy is-
sues make it difficult for voters to assign “responsibili-
ties for outcomes” (Besley, 2006, p. 105; Dunn, 1999, 
p. 337), as do complex institutional structures of deci-
sion-making (Manin et al., 1999, p. 47). Voters’ own 
pluralistic preferences and the diverse characters of 
politicians offer opportunities for manipulative and 
evasive behavior by the latter (Besley, 2006, pp. 106-
107, 124; Ferejohn, 1999, p. 132). In numerous ways, 
political parties may make such behavior more rather 
than less likely (Maravall, 1999, pp. 166-167, 192). Fi-
nally, the absence of a competitive environment for 
politics would be fatal (Besley, 2006, pp. 124-128), and 
various other characteristics of the institutional envi-
ronment surrounding elections may inhibit accounta-
bility. For instance, rules about campaign funding may 
skew representatives’ incentives toward heeding 
prominent donors at the expense of the broader public 
(Manin et al., 1999, pp. 34-35). 
In summary, the frequent appeal to non-electoral 
mechanisms like watchdog and judicial agencies in 
more recent research on accountability (Besley, 2006, 
p. 225; Manin et al., 1999, pp. 50-51; O’Donnell, 2003) 
has been predicated on the tacit or explicit admission 
that elections are incapable of doing the job on their 
own. The most thorough of recent explorations of the 
principal-agent perspective on electoral accountability 
concludes, in conspicuously diplomatic fashion, that “it 
is less than clear whether the weight attached to the 
importance of elections in modern representative de-
mocracies would emerge from this approach” (Besley, 
2006, p. 99). More bluntly, democratic elections are 
“highly imperfect” and possess “incomplete ability to 
discipline and select incumbents” (p. 196). This is more 
or less the early conclusion drawn by Barro and Fere-
john, but now with a great deal more empirical study 
and theoretical reflection behind it. 
It is interesting to note that this “C-minus” kind of 
electoral skepticism, suggesting that elections are not a 
complete failure but do suffer from major deficits of 
accountability, is based on more or less the same limit-
ing conditions that emerged from early theoretic ef-
forts. We can sum them up under four headings: start-
ing with Barro’s five assumptions (three explicit, two 
implicit), we may add a sixth about politicians’ incen-
tives; we may then subtract the two assumptions 
about parties and electoral rules by bundling them to-
gether with the assumption about institutions. (Two 
conditions that define periodic competitive elections, 
as the phenomenon under analysis, are assumed 
throughout rather than enumerated: elections are held 
at stated intervals and always feature more than one 
genuine contender.) 
4. Crucial Conditions of Electoral Accountability 
A. Information. Voters must have good information to 
use in deciding how far to reward or punish politicians 
for actual governmental conduct. Given access to accu-
rate and unbiased information, voters must be able to 
form realistic judgments about the empirical properties 
of politicians and policies if the threat of electoral sanc-
tion is to be fully credible. This type of condition in-
volves both media (as a social structure) and psycholo-
gy or cognition (as an individual trait); our focus will be 
on institutional structures relating to public discourse. 
B. Incentives. Politicians must feel induced by po-
tential rewards and deterred by potential punishments 
if they are to engage in the sort of anticipatory behav-
ior that could be taken as evidence of effective sanc-
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tions. Their attitudes toward office-holding must be 
sufficiently risk-averse, and the perquisites of office 
sufficiently appealing, to make them care about their 
electoral fate in advance of voters’ verdicts. In addition 
to elite culture on topics like honor and shame, formal 
rules about tenure are relevant here; our focus will be 
on institutional structures relating to compensation 
and corruption. 
C. Procedures. Certain basic rules of the electoral 
game must be in place and must be arranged inde-
pendently of the politicians whose fates are stake. Cru-
cially, electoral contests must include genuine alterna-
tives for voters (hence the importance of political 
parties), and other features of the electoral process 
(e.g. districting and funding) must not be rigged for in-
cumbents’ structural advantage. Elite attitudes about 
gaming the system may be relevant here, but this con-
dition is primarily about formal rules and procedures 
relating to parties and campaigns. 
D. Norms. Voters must be able to co-ordinate their 
judgments in order to make the voting process capable 
of delivering an effective sanction with a coherent pur-
pose. In the absence of shared norms about which cri-
teria should determine whether governmental actors 
and actions get rewarded or punished, politicians’ use of 
targeted appeals on different topics for different voters 
may lead to sanctions unrelated to their performance in 
major policy areas. Cultural, psychological, and behav-
ioral variables are obviously preponderant here, but in-
stitutional structures relating to electoral administration 
and vote-counting may also affect voters’ ability to de-
liver coherent verdicts through the ballot box. 
These crucial conditions describe general factors 
that obviously interact with one another in the real 
world to contribute toward electoral outcomes—a key 
consideration for the design of empirical studies that 
pursue precise causal relations and mechanisms. Each 
condition by itself implicates different types of varia-
bles, including both cultural and structural ones. I now 
develop a “top ten” list of more specific spoiler condi-
tions, or types of variance which have empirically been 
found to diminish or vitiate electoral accountability. 
This list provides a capsule or overview of the empirical 
case for electoral skepticism. At the same time, how-
ever, and consistent with the structural focus of my 
analysis, it can organize our thinking about specific in-
stitutional variables whose effects on the capacity of 
periodic competitive elections to endow voters with ef-
fective sanctioning power would make them central to 
normative and programmatic efforts. However dis-
couraging the diagnosis may appear, the prescription 
for a cure depends on it. 
5. Spoiler Conditions of Electoral Accountability 
Two benefits may arise from considering evidence 
about specific circumstances under which the four cru-
cial conditions of electoral accountability are negatively 
impacted. For the design of democratic institutions, we 
need guidance about what sorts of rules and proce-
dures may help or hinder the efficacy of elections as 
vehicles of popular power. For the design of empirical 
studies, whoever aspires to tell plausible causal stories 
about electoral accountability must pay heed to the 
contexts (of information, incentives, procedures, and 
norms) in which the electoral data subject to analysis 
and interpretation have been generated. 
The list of spoiler conditions below tracks the four 
crucial conditions (A through D) but elaborates on each 
one, resulting in more specific factors (1 through 10). 
For each spoiler condition, I offer remarks on not only 
the state of empirical knowledge and methodological 
practice but also theoretical and institutional ramifica-
tions. (Crucial conditions, spoiler conditions, and insti-
tutional remedies are summarized in Table 1.) 
Table 1. Summary of analysis. 
Crucial 
conditions 
Spoiler conditions Intermediate 
remedies 
A. Information 1. Poor information Publicly owned media 
2. Poor judgment Deliberative 
assemblies 
3. Misattributed 
responsibility 
Clarity of jurisdiction 
B. Incentives 4. Misincentives Adequate 
compensation 
5. Pecuniary 
corruption 
Judicial monitoring 
C. Procedures 6. Unequal campaign 
funding 
Public financing, free 
media 
7. Weak parties Internal party 
discipline 
8. Strong parties Non-partisan 
districting, open 
primaries 
D. Norms 9. Electoral fraud Election monitoring 
10. Electoral 
inaccuracy 
Recountable 
technology 
A-1. Poor Information 
The empirical reality of widespread voter ignorance 
about public affairs, even in relatively affluent and ed-
ucated societies (Hardin, 2000), is perhaps the most 
obvious deficit of accountability in actual electoral pro-
cesses. One aspect of the information problem comes 
from the supply side, the news media. For example, we 
know from studies of the USA that there are significant 
inequalities between residents of “rich” and “poor” 
media environments (Arnold, 2004, pp. 251-253), and 
that poor media environments tend to be represented 
by less responsive politicians (Snyder & Stromberg, 
2010). We also know that voters in Italy (Chang, Gold-
en, & Hill, 2010) and the USA (Berry & Howell, 2007) 
have been able to reward or punish incumbents for 
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performance when media gives intensive scrutiny to 
relevant issues, but not otherwise. Failures of journal-
istic institutions, then, translate into failures of elec-
toral accountability. 
An important methodological lesson immediately 
follows from the reality of generally poor information: 
opinion data from opt-in surveys (e.g. Jones, 2011) 
should be treated with caution when interpreting the 
results of quantitative analysis because they tend to 
bias the sample toward better informed members of 
the electorate. 
Electronic media have been altering the traditional 
print and broadcast landscape, of course. It is as yet 
unclear whether new media and channels of infor-
mation will reach as broad an audience (Snyder & 
Stromberg, 2010, pp. 403-404) or will provide the same 
level of investigative reporting (Chang et al., 2010, p. 
216) as traditional print media used to do. In short, 
how far is the “wired” citizen a well informed citizen? 
Some research suggests that, because the World Wide 
Web makes it easier for consumers of news to access 
exclusively partisan sources, “the share of politically 
uninformed people [in the USA] has risen since we en-
tered the so-called information age” (Prior, 2007, p. 
134). It will be crucial to determine whether this find-
ing, suitably updated for the Twitter and smart-phone 
era, extends beyond American shores—and, if not, for 
what reason. 
Programmatically, opportunities for research and 
reform lie in exploring differences across regimes of 
public law as to news and communications. It is widely 
accepted, of course, that press freedom is a necessary 
condition of empowering ordinary citizens with good 
information about their government; but it is not a suf-
ficient condition. In short, media law matters – and 
may be altered more readily than constitutional provi-
sions related to free speech. Some relevant cross-
country variations include public vs. private ownership 
of media and variations in editorial control or censor-
ship by vested interests (governmental or otherwise). 
Theoretically, public ownership tends to remove com-
mercial considerations from the dissemination of polit-
ical news, resulting in greater accuracy and relevance 
of political information. At the same time, governmen-
tal control of content poses a threat to accuracy and 
relevance. A crucial question, then, concerns how far a 
news-provider’s public financing is in fact consistent 
with its operational autonomy from the state, and how 
far striking this balance legally and institutionally can 
make a difference in the information that voters take 
to the polls. 
A-2. Poor Judgment 
The electoral effects of information involve consumers 
as well as producers, and various kinds of cognitive er-
ror and bias among voters may endanger the electoral 
connection. Even when the flow of relevant infor-
mation is at high tide, intensive exposure to major poli-
cy issues may have the effect of exacerbating voters’ 
partisan misperceptions and rationalizations (Claassen 
& Highton, 2006; Wolpert & Gimpel, 1997). Research 
on American politics has shown that misperceptions 
may result from choosing a narrow range of media 
sources even when alternatives are available (Kull, 
Ramsay, & Lewis, 2004). Difficulty of recall leads voters 
to weight recent information much more heavily than 
information about earlier periods of a representative’s 
term (Huber, Hill, & Lenz, 2012), which may explain 
why politicians often wait until just prior to election 
day to engage in deviant behavior resembling respon-
siveness (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 43-44). In a 
broader, comparative context, we know that accurate 
information often passes through partisan or ideologi-
cal filters before voters use it in their electoral choices 
(Anderson, 2007, pp. 279-281), and that many voters 
cling to relatively immovable electoral preferences and 
contort political information into rationalizations of 
those preferences (Maravall, 2010, pp. 91-92). 
In short, even a plentiful supply of political news 
through the media could not guarantee that voters 
would use information in a calculated and instrumental 
fashion on election day. Given the normative assump-
tion that rewards and punishments (in any sphere of 
action) are better dispensed in a calculated rather than 
impulsive way, this is a troubling reality for principal-
agent models and, more broadly, for the prospects of 
elections as vehicles of popular power. The tempting 
response is to abandon all hope for electoral accounta-
bility, or else to embrace it only in the context of a con-
stricted, “opt-in” democracy of deliberative citizens 
(which may flout normative standards of descriptive 
representation). 
Two important caveats, however, may temper this 
kind of response. First, some empirical evidence from 
the USA suggests that exposure to policy-related in-
formation can in fact override elite partisan cues 
among a significant number of citizens, even partisan 
ones (Bullock, 2011). In short, perhaps we simply need 
to see better provision of information (the problem 
addressed above) in order to see citizens using what 
they have more carefully. 
Second, and more theoretically, if citizens’ behavior 
with respect to political information results from their 
sense of efficacy, which in turn is a function of existing 
electoral institutions, then some kinds of electoral re-
form may alter the future behavior of voters. In short, 
those who currently appear hopelessly misinformed 
may only be contingently misinformed, thanks in part 
to electoral structures that currently supply weak in-
centives for becoming informed. Instead of relying on 
institutions of public education to solve general prob-
lems of information and judgment, proposals for learn-
ing by doing may be predicated on the notion that cer-
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tain kinds of political institutions themselves already 
educate (or miseducate) citizens in the habits and skills 
of democratic citizenship. For example, jury service in 
the USA has been shown to increase voting participa-
tion (Gastil, Deess, Weiser, & Simmons, 2010). In a simi-
lar vein, though more focussed on the problem of in-
formation, perhaps theories of “deliberative democracy” 
are most usefully understood as visionary proposals to 
turn focus groups, constituent juries, deliberative as-
semblies, and “Deliberation Day” activities into new 
schools of citizenship. Even if these new schools are no 
more effective than the old (public) schools, the educa-
tive effect of institutions is a useful theoretic premise 
for researchers and reformers to bear in mind when 
considering voter information and judgment. 
A-3. Misattributed Responsibility 
A particularly important aspect of political information 
which is relevant to electoral behavior involves the 
question of who is responsible for what. This is an area 
in which partisan and ideological rationalizations enjoy 
particularly broad scope for playing havoc with voters’ 
judgments. A high level of complexity in not only the 
policy issues themselves but also the institutions that 
make policy can contribute to muddled attributions of 
responsibility. The concept of “clarity of responsibility” 
was devised to measure the institutional properties of 
this dynamic in the analysis of economic voting in Eu-
ropean states (Powell & Whitten, 1993), and a whole 
host of related studies have followed. Voters in Latin 
America have been found to blame incumbents at sub-
national levels of government for the effects of nation-
al policies, and vice versa (Gelineau & Remmer, 2005). 
In a similar vein, the split authorities of “divided feder-
alism” in the USA lead many voters to attribute re-
sponsibility for economic conditions to state governors 
or national presidents based on partisan bias more 
than political or economic reality (Brown, 2010). An-
other study of Latin American voters has found that 
they tend to blame international agencies rather than 
domestic governments for the effects of domestic eco-
nomic policy (Alcaniz & Hellwig, 2011). 
Theoretically, the rule of thumb is that simpler and 
less obscured institutional structures for policy-making 
correspond to fewer “veto players” (Tsebelis, 2002) or 
“vetogates” (Eskridge, 2008). Among other considera-
tions, multiple veto players make a policy process re-
semble a negotiation, with voters in the position of 
outside observers. In any type of negotiation, usually 
only the negotiators themselves know how to allot re-
sponsibility for the outcome—and even there they may 
disagree, to say nothing of the outside observers. The 
political handling of the Greek financial crisis within the 
European Union in the last few years nicely illustrates 
one sort of problem with clarity of responsibility in a 
complex negotiation. 
Programmatically, obscured responsibility is one of 
the most intractable spoiler conditions because it im-
plicates some of the most entrenched features of a po-
litical regime: presidential vs. parliamentary executives, 
unicameral vs. multicameral legislatures, and varieties 
of party system. Intermediate institutional reforms 
may yet have some impact, however. The key theoretic 
consideration here is that clarity of responsibility (as an 
operational factor in voters’ minds) can be promoted 
by clarity of jurisdiction (as an institutional or structural 
factor in public law). Ordinary legislation can in theory 
promote clarity of jurisdiction by rendering the scope 
of authoritative decisions readily traceable to identifia-
ble agents. 
Assistance here is supplied by research that has ex-
panded on the original “horizontal” emphasis of clarity 
of responsibility (i.e. among parties, legislatures, and 
executives, at the national or central level of govern-
ment) by investigating “vertical” jurisdictional relations 
(i.e. between local and central authorities). A cross-
national analysis has found, for example, that the ex-
istence of a federal structure does not pose as great a 
problem for clarity of responsibility for economic policy 
as does the substantive devolution of fiscal powers to 
regional authorities (Anderson, 2006). A unitary system 
with decentralized fiscal powers does more to obscure 
economic reponsibility than a federal system with cen-
tralized fiscal powers. A more fine-grained analysis of 
regional governments in Spain has found that voters 
only struggle to hold the appropriate authorities re-
sponsible when their regional governments share 
evenly balanced powers with the central state, but not 
when regional governments have either high or low 
levels of autonomy vis-a-vis the national regime (Leon, 
2011). The recipe for empowering voters, consistent 
with the structural precept of clarity of jurisdiction, re-
quires choosing either very much or very little decen-
tralization. More generally, reformers might consider 
the message of Thomas Paine (himself a supporter of a 
federal political system, ca. 1776): democracy is fa-
vored by institutional simplicity and retarded by insti-
tutional complexity (Paine, 2003, pp. 7-9, 248-251, 
294-301). 
B-4. Misincentives 
Electoral accountability depends on the motivation of 
incumbents to retain their seats on election day, but 
politicians’ incentives for actually retaining office are 
sometimes too weak to give voters the power of deter-
rent control. In local governments in rural China, for 
example, official salaries are meager and elected offic-
ers therefore little fearful of the consequences of dis-
appointing their constituents’ expectations (Tsai, 2007, 
pp. 254-255). In other countries, the problem does not 
take this form: United States senators’ and representa-
tives’ salaries exceed the median citizen’s earnings by a 
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factor of four or five. But non-monetary aspects of 
elected office can also corrode the motivation to win 
re-election. The potential gains of unrepresentative 
behavior may over-balance the potential costs of poor 
electoral performance. As a study of Brazilian mayors 
has shown, people who become career politicians do 
not necessarily have risk-averse personalities (Pereira, 
Melo, & Figueiredo, 2009). 
Methodologically, therefore, a decision not to face 
the voters again at the next poll cannot always be con-
strued (e.g. Cox & Katz, 2002) as an evasion of likely 
defeat by a risk-averse incumbent; the deterrent effect 
depends heavily on context. 
Programmatically, regimes of election law that as-
pire to promote accountability must be tailored to pro-
vide a solid structure of incentives for elected officers. 
Importantly, these incentives involve not only the local 
standard of living but also cultural variables like honor 
and shame. One danger of raising material rewards like 
salaries is that elected officers may be thereby set off 
as a privileged class, psychically separated from the cit-
izens they are supposed to serve (Bachner & Ginsburg, 
2014). Exploiting moral rewards would be more likely, 
in theory, to have the opposite effect, binding voters 
and politicians together as members of a single citizen 
body. The availability of such rewards, of course, is like-
ly to vary a great deal across countries and cultures, 
making their activation through intermediate institu-
tions like audits and ombudsmen plausible in some 
contexts but not others. 
B-5. Pecuniary Corruption 
Even healthy levels of official compensation might be 
overwhelmed by monetary inducements from unoffi-
cial sources. In theory, modern democracies respect 
the rule of “one person, one vote,” but none of them 
enforces a similarly egalitarian distribution of economic 
resources. An extreme example can serve to illustrate 
the general problem of representatives’ incentives in 
conditions of inequality: the Peruvian state in the 
1990’s played host to an elaborate scheme of bribery, 
operated on behalf of the elected president by his in-
telligence chief (McMillan & Zoido, 2004). The monthly 
cost of a non-partisan judge in Peru was about 
$10,000; of a deputy from another party, $20,000; of 
the owner of a private television network, $60,000. 
This scheme gave members of the opposition ample in-
centives not to be responsive to their supporters. 
Theoretically, pecuniary corruption fundamentally 
severs the causal chain of accountability by skewing 
the incentives that could in principle give deterrent 
power to the prospect of electoral defeat. Moreover, 
whereas kick-backs and bribes may diminish a repre-
sentative’s material incentive to be re-elected at all, 
the stable presence of the sources of corruption would 
tend to lower the probability that victorious challeng-
ers would govern differently from defeated incum-
bents. Even in the absence of direct bribery, other 
kinds of transactions involving the people’s representa-
tives have the potential to overwhelm the electoral 
connection, especially legalized lobbying relationships 
(McMenamin, 2012). 
Programmatically, pre-empting this spoiler condi-
tion seems to depend on structures of public law relat-
ed to informal corruption, directing our attention to-
ward judicial processes in particular. Specialized 
judicial investigation of cases of informal corruption, 
however, must be recognized as an alternative (or, at 
best, a supplement) to another, purely electoral option 
(already discussed above): putting mass media in the 
role of investigators and mass electorates in the role of 
juries. But the efficacy of institutional solutions here 
may be inherently limited by other factors. Compara-
tive analysis suggests that legal political donations by 
business interests can sustain personal relationships 
with decision-makers in some types of economies but 
not others: yes, in “liberal” Canada and Australia; no, in 
“co-ordinated” Germany (McMenamin, 2012). Deep 
economic structures may therefore matter more than 
intermediate institutions in this respect. 
C-6. Unequal Campaign Funding 
Financial inequality can also lead, at least in states 
where campaigns are funded by private donors, to a 
more formal, legalized inequality of influence over 
elected officers. This is one of several respects in which 
the procedural environment in which elections take 
place can effect elite rather than popular control of 
public affairs. Because campaign-related institutions al-
so impact conditions of public information and dis-
course, they deserve separate treatment from the 
problem of informal pecuniary corruption. 
Methodologically, a focus on roll-call position-
taking (e.g. Gailmard & Jenkins, 2009) has been used to 
determine whether votes follow dollars, with generally 
negative results. But this approach systematically un-
derstates the influence of economic interests on policy 
because many important benefits are actually distrib-
uted in less visible (and less easily quantified) ways, 
e.g. legislative amendments and regulatory directives 
(Fellowes & Wolf, 2004). More incisive analytics tend 
to give more cause for concern. One attempt to ana-
lyze campaign funding in terms of an “investment the-
ory” of American electoral politics has found evidence 
that parties and candidates switch policies after elec-
tions in response to the interests of campaign donors 
(Ferguson, 1995): the deterrent power of votes, in oth-
er words, can be matched by that of dollars. It also 
makes strategic sense for elected officers to anticipate 
the reactions to their policies of not only their own do-
nors but also their opponents’ (Ball, 1999): the threat of 
a future donation to one’s opponent may be as effective 
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as a past donation to oneself. This is a kind of electoral 
accountability, but with sanctioning power held by mon-
eyed elites more than enfranchised citizens. 
Programmatically, various legal regulations of the 
campaign process may affect the susceptibility of 
elected officers to incentives provided by campaign 
donations. Schemes of private financing and paid pub-
licity should be expected to diminish the relative power 
of votes compared to dollars. This expectation accords 
with the baseline assumption that public financing and 
free publicity are intermediate conditions of electoral 
accountability. 
A key theoretic issue in this connection involves 
levels of electoral competition. Financial regulations 
may bear on how competitive races are, and competi-
tiveness may be a necessary condition of electoral ac-
countability. The classic assumption is that a high level 
of competitiveness is needed to pose a credible deter-
rent against incumbents’ bad behavior (i.e. the risk of 
losing office must be tangible). Recent research sug-
gests, moreover, that more competitive races yield in-
formationally richer campaigns (Lipsitz, 2011), thereby 
aiding voter judgments about whom to reward and 
whom to punish. On the other hand, uncompetitive 
races might be taken as a sign that voters know what 
they want and politicians are good at giving it to them 
(Buchler, 2011). On balance, however, this second per-
spective seems less compelling because it assumes a 
high level of accountability in order to explain a lack of 
competitiveness, rather than addressing the causal 
prerequisites of accountability itself. 
Varying levels of competitiveness have been stud-
ied across the USA’s multiple electoral jurisdictions. 
The difficulty of challengers in gathering funds against 
an entrenched incumbent, for instance, has been iden-
tified as one of the principal causes of the decline in 
competitive elections for Congress (Abramowitz, Alex-
ander, & Gunning, 2006b). The weakness of state-level 
campaign-funding regulations designed to reduce fund-
ing inequalities has been found to play a similarly anti-
competitive role in sub-national elections (Hamm & 
Hogan, 2008; Hogan, 2004). If high levels of infor-
mation and competition in election campaigns pro-
mote electoral accountability, institutions that permit 
or encourage funding inequalities presumably consti-
tute a spoiler condition. 
C-7. Weak Parties 
Variations in partisan institutions can have an enor-
mous impact on electoral dynamics, and political scien-
tists have long felt that strong parties are essential to 
collective accountability (e.g. Carey, 2009). Strong par-
ties could in theory supply coherent ideological cues to 
compensate for voters’ limited information, yet the 
failure of parties actually to play this role in various 
contexts has often been lamented. One of the signal 
cases of such lamentation, at the conclusion of an oth-
erwise sanguine account of the analytic possibilities of 
“retrospective voting,” held that “collective responsi-
bility has leaked out of the system” as a result of Amer-
ican parties’ lack of organizational and ideological co-
herence (Fiorina, 1981, pp. 202-210). A similar problem 
arises where a lack of partisan unity obscures “clarity 
of responsibility” for policy (Powell, 2000, chapter 3) or 
fails to offer viable electoral alternatives, which are es-
sential to make ballots count as sanctions (Anderson, 
2007, pp. 281-286). If elected, structurally weak parties 
may be unable to carry out a policy program that is re-
sponsive to those voters who deliberately deposed the 
incumbents. 
Programmatically, though a country’s party system 
as a whole may implicate the grand level of constitu-
tional structure, weak political parties could be com-
batted at the intermediate level of internal procedure. 
Rules of candidate selection, for example, are often de-
termined internally but may have broader effects justi-
fying regulation through public law. Here a theoretic di-
lemma arises. The most internally democratic 
procedures, such as the direct balloting of party mem-
bers to nominate candidates, may conflict with other 
liberal values (Hazan & Rahat, 2010) to the extent that 
they render partisan organizations disorganized or un-
disciplined. For our purposes, however, the relevant 
point is analytic rather than normative: internal weak-
ness can inhibit parties’ role in electoral accountability 
throughout the polity as a whole. Theoretically, then, 
intermediate measures of public law which regulate in-
ternal procedures to promote party discipline would 
tend to promote electoral accountability. 
C-8. Strong Parties 
If political parties may endanger accountability when 
they are too weak internally, they are also a threat 
when too strong externally. For example, in the ab-
sence of a national electoral administration in the USA 
(Lehoucq, 2002, pp. 40-43), state-level party organiza-
tions have historically set the rules of the electoral 
game, thereby shaping the conditions under which 
their members are supposed to be subject to electoral 
control (and at all levels of government, local and na-
tional alike). In most American states, the two major 
parties face lower barriers to ballot access than others 
but may nonetheless exclude non-members from nom-
inating-primary elections. As a result, American prima-
ries tend to be steered by a relatively small minority of 
ideological extremists (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 32-
36; Lee, Moretti, & Butler, 2004; Masket & Noel, 2012). 
Partisan control of the boundaries of electoral districts 
also injects party-elite judgments into electoral results 
at an early stage of the electoral process in the USA 
(Thompson, 2004, pp. 52-55). The steady decline in the 
number of competitive or “marginal” districts for the 
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House of Representatives in recent decades is an un-
disputed trend, though the causal agency of partisan 
redistricting is hotly debated (see Abramowitz et al., 
2006a; McDonald, 2006). 
Theoretically, the danger to electoral accountability 
comes not from all kinds of partisan strength but spe-
cifically from control over core electoral institutions. It 
has been understood since the early principal-agent 
models that electoral results could be said to reflect 
elite more than popular judgments as parties become 
strong enough to control the basic procedures by 
which governments are supposed to be held accounta-
ble. The drawing of “safe” partisan districts, in particu-
lar, may be the USA’s peculiar contribution toward mi-
nority rule. If a small number of strong partisans can 
oust an incumbent in a nominating primary that ex-
cludes non-members, but a much larger number of 
voters cannot do the same at the general election be-
cause the district as a whole is uncompetitive, the prin-
cipal to whom the incumbent is truly accountable is the 
smaller faction, not the larger. Beyond the USA, broad-
er trends in partisan organization (which have fallen 
under the rubric of the “cartel party” thesis) indicate 
that major parties around the world are increasingly 
able to sustain their positions through state support, to 
place control of electoral processes in the hands of par-
tisan legislators, and to engage in collusive behavior 
with one another within any given party system (Katz & 
Mair, 2009). Such trends violate the openness and 
competitiveness that are assumed to be necessary for 
votes to act as effective sanctions. 
Programmatically, non-partisan districting can 
weaken parties in the sense in which strength would 
tend to crush electoral accountability. In the US states, 
independent districting commissions (such as are used 
at the national level in other countries) have been 
found to lead to more competitive races (Cottrill, 
2012). Higher levels of electoral competition, in turn, 
can have a variety of pro-accountability effects, includ-
ing a richer informational environment for voters dur-
ing the campaign season (Lipsitz, 2011). 
With respect to candidate selection, however, the 
crucial theoretic insight is that appropriate institutional 
reforms depend very much on the broader partisan 
context. In light of the value of internal party discipline 
(see C-7 above), measures of public law should at the 
same time aspire to weaken parties externally so that 
dissenting party members have real exit options (i.e. 
access to other viable parties). In an entrenched parti-
san duopoly, however, the lack of viable exit options 
would require that parties also be weakened internally 
in the sense that public law should force them to nom-
inate their candidates through open primaries. These 
are intermediate institutional fixes that may be more 
readily available than other, more comprehensive 
measures, such as the creation of multi-member dis-
tricts or proportional voting schemes. 
D-9. Electoral Fraud 
The fourth crucial condition (D), relating to voters’ 
norms, is bound to implicate cultural and behavioral 
variables outside the institutional focus of my analysis. 
Yet some procedural structures do crucially impinge on 
our ability to interpret voting as an act with sanctioning 
power. Most democrats intuitively sense that an accu-
rate count of votes is the sine qua non of interpreting 
the outcome as a popular reward or a popular punish-
ment; otherwise the voters’ will does not fully deter-
mine the outcome. Factors promoting inaccurate tallies 
therefore become relevant to the question of electoral 
accountability. 
The ease and variety of methods of manipulating 
electoral results in mass elections involving thousands 
or millions of voters are often under-estimated or as-
sumed away. There are, first of all, “pre-election tools” 
(Donno & Roussias, 2012) that are designed to intimi-
date and to discourage electoral competition. Fraud 
properly speaking then comes in the form of classic 
strategies such as registering fictitious, deceased, or 
otherwise ineligible voters; using “repeaters” to vote 
more than once; imprisoning eligible voters and releas-
ing them after the polls are closed; physically blocking 
eligible voters from leaving home or entering a polling 
station; administratively purging eligibile voters from 
voting lists; bribing or intimidating eligible voters be-
fore they cast their ballots; and tampering with ballots 
or otherwise miscounting them after they are cast. 
Though the academic literature on electoral fraud is 
relatively thin (Lehoucq, 2003, pp. 236-237), these 
techniques have been amply attested for the nine-
teenth-century USA (Argersinger, 1985), nineteenth-
century Spain (Darde, 1996), and the twentieth-century 
USA (Campbell, 2005), for example. Recent cases of 
fraud have attracted attention in Russia and Ukraine 
(Myagkov, Ordeshook, & Shakin, 2009) as well as Great 
Britain, Mexico, Germany, Taiwan, Spain, and Argenti-
na (Lehoucq, 2003, pp. 237-245). Of course the 2000 
presidential vote in the American state of Florida fa-
mously failed to meet basic international standards of 
“free and fair” elections such that fraud could be ruled 
out (Bjornlund, 2004, pp. 3-6). 
Methodologically, electoral fraud may affect not 
only political careers but also academic ones. Political 
scientists, especially those reliant on vote-share as a 
key variable, routinely assume the accuracy of official 
electoral results. In so far as reliable counts are essen-
tial to interpreting the popular will behind the voting, 
the reality of fraud should be taken seriously in elec-
toral studies. 
Programmatically, schemes of election monitoring, 
both formal (e.g. international teams of monitors) and 
informal (e.g. domestic journalists and party activists), 
may help to promote clean elections. Domestically, a 
centralized and professionalized electoral administra-
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tion is taken for granted as a prerequisite in some but 
not all democracies. Research on Latin America, for ex-
ample, has found that a non-partisan, professional 
electoral administration at the national level is virtually 
a sufficient condition of clean elections (Hartlyn, 
McCoy, & Mustillo, 2008); in contexts with relatively 
low levels of fear and polarization, an electoral com-
mission staffed according to balanced partisan repre-
sentation may also do the trick. 
D-10. Electoral Inaccuracy 
Contrary to popular belief, basic facts of life mean that 
there are no definitive technical solutions to the prob-
lem of inaccurate electoral results—whether inten-
tionally inaccurate (via fraud) or unintentionally so. 
Studies of elections in the United States suggest that 
voter error in any given election accounts for 1.5% to 
2.5% of the total vote (Stewart, 2010, p. 372). It is well 
known that certain types of ballot yield lower rates of 
voter error than others, e.g. optical-scan (less) vs. 
punch-card ballots (more) (Saltman, 2006, p. 189). 
Techniques for counting ballots are as important as for 
marking them. Computer technology, for instance, can 
reduce marking errors (Herrnson et al., 2008, chapter 
4) but may not offer counting procedures that are se-
cure from fraudulent activity (pp. 111-112). As long ago 
as the early 1970’s, when computers were first used to 
tabulate results from elections in southern California, a 
team of computer scientists demonstrated that the 
voting results could be systematically skewed by tech-
nical manipulation (Saltman, 2006, pp. 166-167); the 
trick has been repeated with computerized “touch-
screen” voting machines in recent years (pp. 201-204). 
There is a catch-22 within touch-screen technology, 
which promises relatively low error rates but also rela-
tively little possibility of public verification (Stewart, 
2010, pp. 359, 364, 367-368): attempts to make com-
puterized voting machines generate auditable paper-
trails have had the side-effect of increasing voter error 
(Herrnson et al., 2008, chapter 6). 
Theoretically, political scientists should consider the 
concept of recountability, or the capacity of electoral 
machinery to have its results publicly verified or 
checked, as an essential operational component of 
electoral accountability. Reformed administrative prac-
tices cannot solve the basic problem that computer-
processed results are not amenable to a genuine re-
count: as electoral technology becomes more sophisti-
cated, the number of persons capable of certifying the 
results (i.e. qualified software engineers) shrinks. Un-
like a twelve-member jury or a 500-member assembly, 
a mass electorate makes a publicly verifiable count 
very slow and very costly to conduct. But even a slow 
and costly recount is better than no recount at all, if 
electoral accountability truly depends on accurate 
vote-tallies. 
Programmatically, the agenda for intermediate in-
stitutional remedies should be to use administrative 
and legislative measures to ensure the use of appropri-
ate voting technology. If recountability is taken to be a 
sine qua non of electoral fairness and accuracy, the 
current state of research suggests that paper ballots 
designed to be read by optical-scan machines offer a 
reasonable balance between relatively low error rates 
and relatively easy recounts. 
6. Conclusion 
Synthesizing theoretical and empirical research on 
electoral accountability reveals that some democracies’ 
institutions endow them with greater capacity to chan-
nel popular power through the electoral process than 
others. It is clear, in particular, that democracies with 
publicly owned media, adequate compensation for 
representatives, public financing of campaigns, free-of-
charge campaign broadcasts, closely monitored elec-
tions, and recountable voting technology offer a signif-
icantly greater chance for voters to hold governments 
accountable than do democracies without these re-
sources. This difference is theoretical in nature: a well-
founded, analytically coherent expectation about insti-
tutional effects on the all-important (and hard to oper-
ationalize) value of popular power. 
The theoretical picture is less clear for other kinds 
of institutions than those just mentioned, but my rein-
terpretation of the principal-agent approach to elec-
toral accountability nonetheless supplies sound as-
sumptions to guide future research. Problems of voter 
judgment may have no solution at all, or no institution-
al solution, but theories of and experiments with delib-
erative assemblies are laudable efforts to investigate 
that question. Clarity of responsibility may be all but 
unachievable outside jurisdictions that are governed by 
a unicameral parliament, barring major constitutional 
upheaval. Judicial monitoring of informal corruption 
may be motivated by voter ignorance or inattention, 
but it also keeps citizens dependent on the good will of 
judicial elites themselves. The analytical point here is 
that relying on institutionalized popular power is dif-
ferent from depending on the democratic benevolence 
of elite agents. 
Perhaps the most complex aspect of electoral ac-
countability involves parties and party systems, since 
different contexts demand different (even opposite) 
institutional remedies. In multi-party systems with 
plentiful options for voters and activists, internal party 
discipline is essential and should be promoted by, for 
example, closed mechanisms of candidate selection. In 
less fluid party systems, in which electoral viability and 
actual legislative representation are precious resources 
reserved only for two or three parties, internal govern-
ance should be opened up as much as possible, espe-
cially for non-members. The up-shot is that electoral 
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accountability requires “open primaries” in the USA 
but closed processes in multi-party democracies. 
The “top ten” list of spoiler conditions does present 
a daunting challenge for the idea of elections as vehi-
cles of popular power, but it also offers guidance for 
meeting the challenge. Nonetheless, some may believe 
that this notion should itself be abandoned in favor of 
a focus on new kinds of legislative structure selected by 
non-electoral means. Or, easier still, hope for strong 
accountability could give way to a chastened, “mini-
malist” vision of electoral democracy: a modest project 
with a decent track-record of installing liberal and mild 
elites over a quarrelsome yet largely peaceable popu-
lace. This model may indeed describe actual Western 
democracies better than does the old-fashioned, rhe-
torically spirited account of the modern constitutional 
republic as a form of popular self-government. It is also 
possible that the insurgent citizens who have been 
clamoring for political control over their own lives in 
recent years, whether in Egypt or Iran or Hong Kong (or 
Greece or Spain, for that matter), are acting in either 
ironic or delusional fashion. If they are not, however, 
the possibility of institutionalizing popular power 
through redesigning electoral structures is something 
that the cause of civil peace cannot do without. 
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